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Abstract
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describea computational model of concept formationand categorizationthat exploitsa rational
analysisofba,ic-leveleffectsby Gluck and Corter(1985).Their work providesa cleanprescription
of human categorypreferencesthat we adapt to the task of concept learning. In addition,we
extend their analyses to account for typicality (Rosch & Mervis, 1975) and fan (Anderson, 1974)
effects, and speculate on how our concept formation strategies might be extended to other facets
of intelligence, such as problem solving.
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STRUCTURE AND FORMATION OF CATEGORIES I
1. Introduction
Cognitivesimulationfits computational mechanisms to the constraintsofpsychologicaldata,but
therehas been long-term debate over the appropriatestartingpoint for thisprocess.Newell and
Simon (1972)recommend an initialtaskanalys_, inwhich one identifiesalternativeapproachesto a
given task(e.g.,cryptarithmetic).Anderson (inpress)suggestsa more formal rationalanalysis,in
which one associatesa generalcategoryof behaviors(e.g.,concept formation) with a performance
function to be optimized. In both views,the guiding assumption isthat natural organisms are
rationalbut resource-bounded decisionmakers (Simon, 1969). A similarbut lessformal view
is implicitin speculativeanalyses (Hall & Kibler,1985),which posit high-levelcomputational
principlesthat constrainhuman processing(e.g.,Kolodner,1983).
This paper focuseson COBWEB (Fisher,1987a,1987b),a cognitivesimulationofconcept forma-
tionand recognition.In particular,we trace the originsofthe system to rationaland speculative
analysesof thistask. Concept formation is a processof organizingobservationsinto categories
based on internalizedmeasures of category 'quality',without the aid of an externaltutor.More-
over,thisprocessof categoryformation should be guidedby two principles.First,learningshould
be incremental,in that observationsshould be efficientlyincorporatedinto memory as they are
encountered. Second, learningshould benefitperformance on some task,in thiscasepredictions
about unknown propertiesof novel observations.
To realizetheseobjectives,the COBWEB model borrows a measure of concept qualitydeveloped
by Gluck and Corter (1985) in theirwork on basic-leveleffectsin humans (alsosee Cotter &
Gluck, 1985).In hierarchicalclassificationschemes,humans tend to preferone levelof abstraction
(the 'basic'level)over others.Gluck and Corter'smeasure, categoryutility/,came from a rational
analysiswhich postulatedthatbasicconceptsare preferredbecause they optimize inferenceability.
COBWEB alsoincorporatesideasfrom Kolodner's (1983) CYRUS and Lebowitz's (1982) UNIMEM,
which providegeneralstrategiesofefficientclassificationa d conceptformation. This union yields
a system thatmeets the computational objectivesofefficientretrievaland accurateprediction.In
addition,the model accounts for certaintypicality/effects(Rosch & Mervis, 1975) and fan effects
(Anderson, 1976). Thus, itprovides a unifiedaccount for a number of memory phenomena in a
single,parameter-freemodel of conceptrepresentationand concept formation.
In the followingsection,we introducesome computationaland psychologicalprinciplesofconcept
learningand representation.Notably, we view concept formation and relatedtasks in terms of
searchthrough a statespace.After this,Section3 reviewspsychologicalfindingsthatconstrainthe
representation,access,and acquisitionofconcepts.In Section4 we describeCOBWEB, a model of
conceptformationthatincorporatestheseconstraints.Section5 then evaluatesthe model in terms
of itsabilityto explain a varietyof psychologicaleffectsand the relationsamong them. In the
finalsection,we speculateon other applicationsofthe model, includingthe transitionfrom novice
to expertproblem-solvingskills.Implicitly,our discussionwill.endorse Anderson's rationalview
of cognitivesimulationas a profitablemethodology to pursue issuesat the boundary of cognitive
psychology and artificialintelligence.
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2. Concept learning
Concept learninghas been widelystudiedin both artificialintelligence(AI) and psychology.How-
ever,both fieldshave traditionallyemphasized learningtasks in which a tutorprovidesclassin-
formation. We begin thissectionby discussingmethods for such supervisedlearning,sincethey
provideimportant background for our laterdiscussionof concept formation. In particular,we in-
troducethe view of concept learningas a searchprocess,in which learningmechanisms may vary
along two dimensions: searchcontroland searchdirection.We then extend the searchframework
to clusteringand concept formation,types of unsupervised learningin which thereisno external
tutorto provide classinformation.
2.1 Supervised Learning
Many psychological studies of learning have focused on concept acquisition or identification (Bruner,
Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; Hunt, Marin, & Stone, 1966; Reed, 1972; Medin & Schaffer, 1978), in
which a subject must learn to identify novel members of categories, given training observations that
are classified by the experimenter. In many experimental settings, the subject is shown a sequence
of observations; after viewing each observation, the subject must predict the category membership
of that observation and is then told the correct category. Thus, the experimental setting usually
requires continuous and active participation by the subject. Psychological investigations have
focused on characterizing the number of observations that subjects require to consistently predict
correct category membership and on the number of classification errors made before they attain
criterial accuracy.
Because it involves external feedback, concept acquisition is sometimes referred to as super-
vised learning. In artificial intelligence, this task is more commonly called learning from ezarnples
(Winston, 1975; Quinlan, 1979; Mitchell, 1982; Dietterich & Michalski, 1983), since a tutor sup-
plies preclassified examples from which the learning system must discover an appropriate concept
(intensionai) description. Many machine learning systems assume that the target Concept to be
learned is conjunctive; thus the learner acquires concept(s) that capture shared conditions over all
of the observations.
The notion of search plays a traditional role in characterizing AI systems, and one can apply this
idea to systems that learn concepts (Simon & Lea, 1974; Mitchell, 1982). One important aspect
is the direction of the search process. Many AI concept learning systems begin by comparing two
observations and extracting the commonalities between them (Hayes-Roth &: McDermott, 1978;
Vere, 1980). They then compare these common features to a third observation, again extracting the
collective commonality. This process continues until they have exhausted all the observations, thus
yieldingthe common structurethatsummarizes the entireset.This strategyfollowsa specific-to-
generaldirection,sincethe setof common featuresisinitializedas a specificinstanceand gradually
becomes more generalas more observationsare seen.In contrast,othersystems followa general-to-
specificstrategy(Langley,1987;Schlimmer & Fisher,1986).These systemsbegin with verygeneral
concept descriptions,making them more specificas errorssuggestthe need formore constrained
conditions.Further errorslead to even more specificconcepts,untilthey achievea description
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that summarizes all the training instances. Still other systems (Anderson & Kline, 1979; Mitchell,
1982; Schlimmer & Granger, 1986) combine these two strategies, carrying out bidirectional search
through the space of concept descriptions.
Concept learning systems also vary in terms of their search control strategy. In general, there
will be many concept descriptions that cover the training observations, and one must somehow deal
with these alternatives. For example, suppose the learner sees two card hands, one with three Jacks
and two Kings, and a second with two Jacks and three Kings. One hypothesis that summarizes
these observations is that the hands contain at least two Jacks and at least two Kings, but an
alternative summary is that they contain two cards of one face and three of another (i.e., a full
house). Such alternatives are the cause of search in concept learning, and researchers have used a
variety of strategies to control this search. These methods range from exhaustive techniques like
breadth-first search, which retain all concepts that are consistent with the known observations (e.g.,
Mitchell, 1982), to heuristic methods like beam search (Michalski, 1983), which retains only the
'best' hypotheses that are consistent with the observations.
Unlike experimental human subjects in psychology, many AI learning systems are not required
to actively predict class membership for each incoming observation. Rather, they process all avail-
able observations en masse to produce a set of concept descriptions that are consistent with the
observations. This is not to say that many systems could not be adapted to actively predict mem-
bership, but they were not designed with this performance task in mind. For instance, Quinlan's
(1979, 1986) ID3 algorithm uses a heuristic that requires examination of all observations, thus
complicating any strategy for generating intermediate predictions. However, one can modify the
basic method to construct descriptions incrementally (Sctdimmer & Fisher, 1986; Utgoff, 1988),
giving it the ability to make predictions after each training instance.
Although 'nonincremental' approaches have predominated in the literature on machine learning, a
growing number of researchers have examined incremental methods for concept learning. Examples
include a system by Winston (1975) and Schlimmer and Granger's (1986) STACC_.R system, which
generate predictions for each incoming observation. One can view such systems as conducting a form
of constrained search called hill climbing, which maintains a single 'active' concept description that
may be modified after each training instance. 1 These systems keep no explicit memory of previous
hypotheses, though they may simulate backtracking (return to an earlier hypothesis) by application
of their learning mechanisms.
Limiting search to one change per observation characterizes hiU-climbing learners: a single al-
ternative is kept in memory and intermediate predictions are made efficiently. Of course, placing
limits on memory and backtracking ability means that the order of training instances can have an
important effect, sometimes leading the learning system astray. However, such order effects have
also been observed in human learners (e.g., Kline, 1983), making them desirable characteristics of
I. Not all incremental learning systems should be viewed ss hill climbers. For instance, some methods (Anderson
& Kllne, 1979; Langley, 1987) retain a large set of competing descriptions, using the competitor with the highest
'strength' to make a prediction. In addition, Winston's system is not a strict hill climber in that it retains
some true backtracking ability, but nonetheless it has many of the characteristics that we deem important for
incremental learning.
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a computational model. We will return to the notion of incremental hill climbing when we discuss
the task of concept formation.
2.2 Unsupervised Learning
Despite the attractiveness of supervised learning tasks, there are many scenarios in which a learner
cannot rely on external feedback. In such cases, the learner must invoke internalized heuristics
to organize its observations. For example, many machine learning systems incorporate a notion
of 'similarity'. Such a bias also occurs in work on numerical taxonomy (Everitt, 1980; Gennari,
1989), in which algorithms use a similarity measure (e.g., the inverse of Euclidean distance) to
group similar observations into the same category.
To clarify this point, let us consider some algorithms from the numerical taxonomy literature.
For instance, 'nearest-neighbor' methods place an observation in the category that has the most
similar current member. Other methods compute a theoretical observation that represents the
central tendency (i.e., the centroid) of each category; they then place the new observation with
the category having the most similar centroid. These methods have the emergent effect of placing
great emphasis on maximizing the intra-category (i.e., within-category) similarity of observations.
Although this approach has intuitive appeal, it presents difficulties if one wishes to break the
observations into a number of contrasting categories. In reference to psychological models, Medin
(1983) points out that the set of singleton categories optimizes intra-category similarity, since each
observation is maximally similar to itself. Thus, attention on intra-category similarity alone does
not provide a sufficient basis for deciding upon the appropriate number of clusters. As a result,
clustering methods often require that the user specify the number of categories to be formed.
Alternatively, they build a tree called a dendrogram, in which each node specifies a cluster of lower-
level nodes, terminating in in&vidual observations. Following the clustering process, the user severs
the tree at various points to obtain the desired number of clusters.
Some techniques of numerical taxonomy explicitly seek to optimize a function of contrast-
ing categories. However, just as intra-category similarity favors singleton classes, inter-category
d/ssimilarity favors a single all-inclusive category, since there are no contrasting categories to share
properties with it (Medin, 1983). Thus, a reliance on both these measures might reduce the need
for user intervention. To this end, some methods incorporate a tradeoff between intra-group and
inter-group similarities, favoring categories whose members have much in common with each other
and little in common with members of contrasting categories. In Section 3 we examine one such
tradeoff function.
Recently, machine learning researchers have developed methods for conceptual clustering. For
example, Michalski and Stepp's (1983) CLUSTER attempts to form categories that have 'good' con-
cept descriptions, which can be stated as conjunctive expressions of features that are common to
al/or most category members. One criterion, simplicity, dictates that the conjunctive expression
should be short for the sake of comprehensibility. A second criterion, fit, prefers detailed (specific)
conjunctive descriptions. These criteria (and others) trade off against one another in much the
same way as intra-category and inter-category similarity. The ability to form very simple discrim-
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inating concepts for contrasting categories implies very little overlap between members of different
categories, whereas specific categories implies that there is considerable intra-category similarity. 2
Other nonincremental clustering systems include Hanson and Batter's (1989) WITT and Cheese-
man, KeUy, Self, Stutz, Taylor, and Freeman's (1988) AUTOCLASS. The former computes cor-
relations between feature pairs, forming clusters so as to m_e the intra-category pairwise
correlations across all features and to minimize the average inter-category pairwise correlations
across all features and all contrasting categories. AUTOCLASS represents another probabilistic ap-
proach to clustering, using a Bayesian method to calculate the 'most probable' categories present
in the observations. Intuitively, the most probable clusters are those whose feature distributions
vary most from a presumed prior distribution. As with WITT, AUTOCLASS is sensitive to intra-
category and inter-category similarities, and thus need not be told the number of clusters to form.
The systems are also suuilar in their lack of any method for making intermediate predictions. 3
We now turn to methods for unsupervised learning that support continuous interaction with the
environment.
2.3 Concept Formation
The unsupervised systems that we have described so far are nonincremental, requiring alltraining
instances at the outset. However, in many cases human learners appear to assimilate instances as
they become available. We will refer to this process - the incremental unsupervised acquisition
of categories and their intensional descriptions - as concept formation. As with learning from
examples, concept formation can be described in terms of search, and two general approaches have
been explored in psychology and machine learning.
The firstscheme employs a specific-to-generalsearch, incrementally comparing each new obser-
vation to existing categories and adding it to one or more of the best-matching categories. In
Kolodner's (1983) CYRUS and Lebowitz's (1982) UNIMEM, matching is a function of the number of
features shared by the new observation and a given concept description. These systems generalizea
concept ifthe match with the new observation issufficientlygood. Ifan observation does not match
any concept to a prespecifieddegree then the new observation isused to create a singleton category
that may be generalized with future observations. In the process, UNIMEM and CYRUS form an
abstraction hierarchy of concepts that they use to classifyfuture cases, filteringeach observation
through levelsof the hierarchy by recursive application of the matching procedure. Both systems
can be viewed as advanced versions of Feigenbaum's (1963) EPAM, which formed discrimination
networks (actually trees)with tests that were restrictedto singlefeatures.
One can also employ a general-to-specificstrategy for concept formation, as shown by Martin's
(1989) CORA system. Like itsprecursor STAGGER (Schlimmer & Granger, 1986), the model incre-
mentally conjoins features, but it relieson correlationsbetween features to trigger this chunking
2. Studies by Medin, Wattenmaker, and Michalski (1986) qualify the extent to which fit and simplicity trade against
each other in human sorting taslm in which subjects have simultaneous access to all observations. Their experi-
mental task corresponds to nonincremental, unsupervised learning.
3. Hanson and Bauer note that their system can be run in incremental mode, but it was not designed with prediction
in mind.
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process, rather than monitoring correct and incorrect predictions of category membership. CORA's
reliance on feature correlations is similar to that used in WITT, but it descends most directly from
Chalnick and Billman's (1988) work. However, whereas CORA uses observed correlations to con-
join features, its ancestor uses observed correlations to slowly generalize initially saved instances.
Neither CoRA or the earlier system forms an abstraction hierarchy; they simply create concepts
that are conjunctions of features and that describe (possibly nondisjoint) categories.
Although approaches to concept formation may differ in search direction, they seem to universally
share the hil]-climbing organization of their incremental counterparts for supervised ]earning. As
such, they may suffer from ordering effects, in that they may discover different categories depending
on the order in which they process observations. The design of concept formation methods differs
from that of nonincremental clustering systems, in that it is largely motivated by the realization
that many real-world domains require continuous interaction with the environment. Mechanisms
for concept formation are designed to be rational but resource-bounded learners (Simon, 1969).
Each observationtriggerssmall changes to the currentcategoricalstructure,although simulated
forms ofbacktrackingmay be used to insurethatmajor changes can occur overtime. For example,
UNIMEM deletesa node and itsassociatedsubtreeifthe node's corresponding concept becomes
poor by a criterionsimilarto CLUSTER/2's fitmeasure. This allowsa new subtreeto be grown to
reflecthe characteristicsoffuturedata. Section4 elaborateson some of theseissuesinthe context
of our COBWEB system.
3. Psychological Constraints on Concept Formation
The previous sectiontouched upon psychologicalconsiderationsin concept learning,but itsmain
focuswas on searchas a genericframework inwhich to view thistask.The currentsectionconsiders
psychologicalfindingsin greaterdetail,notably typicalityand basic-leveleffects,along with their
implicationsforthe representationand formationofconcepts.
3.1 Typicality Effects and Probabilistic Concepts
Smith and Medin (1981)referto conjunctivedescriptions,discussedearlier,as classicalrepresenta-
tionsof conceptual structure.One implicationof such classicalrepresentationsisthat allconcept
members are treated equM1y during classification,since an observationeitherhas the requisite
conjunctionof featuresor itdoes not. However, experimentshave repeatedlyshown that human
subjectsdo not treatconcept instancesequally,but regard certainmembers as more 'typical'than
others.For example, in a targetrecognitiontask,subjectsmust determine ifa testinstanceisa
member of a targetcategory (e.g.,'Iss robin a bird?').Severalstudies(Rips,Shoben, 8z Smith,
1973;Rosch& Mervis, 1975) indicatethatsubjectsconsistentlyrespond aITtrmativelymore quickly
tocertainpositiveinstancesthan to others.For example, they willmore quicklyaITn'mthata robin
isa bird than they willaifixmthat a chickenisa bird. The relativeranking ofpositivetestitems
correspondsto a typicalityranking ofcategorymembers, and thisconclusionisbolsteredby results
in a varietyof other experimentaltasks(Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Smith & Medin, 1981).
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3.1.1 PIIOBABILISTIC CONCEPTS: INDEPENDENT CUE MODELS
Classical representations do not easily account for typicality effects, and in response, researchers
have proposed a number of alternative concept representations. Rosch and Mervis (1975) made an
early attempt to discover the structural determinants of typicality, finding that category members
sharing features with many other members of the same category tend to be judged more typical. In
addition, when a disjoint, contrasting category is involved, members that share few features with
members of the contrasting category tend to be judged more typical. This sensitivity to intra-
category and inter-category overlap of features is captured by their notion of family resemblance.
The apparent relation between family resemblance and typicality indicates the importance of
feature distributions in human classification. Although classical representations cannot capture such
distributional information, probabil/stic concept representations (Smith _ Medin, 1981) manage this
by associating a probability, weight, or some other confidence number with each feature of a concept
definition. A straightforward implementation is to store the conditional probability, P(f[C'k), of
each feature f's presence with respect to each category Ck; this is more commonly called the
category validity (Medin, 1983) of the feature. Recognition or classification using probabilistic
concepts usually involves summing the weights of features that are present in a new observation
(Collins & Loftus, 1975; Smith, Shoben, & Kips, 1974; Smith & Medin, 1981). Classification may
be based on whether this sum passes a specified threshold (Smith &Medin, 1981), as in neuron-llke
processing units (Nilsson, 1965; Hinton, 1989), or one may assign an observation to the category
that maximizes the sum, as in Bayesian classifiers (Duda & Hart, 1973).
The probabilistic account offers an explanation of typicality effects in that typical instances will
have features shared by many other members of the same category, giving them higher category
validities. If one assumes that recognition time is inversely proportional to these sums, then obser-
vations with high intra-category similarity will be recognized more quickly and thus be regarded
as more typical. On its own, this scheme does not explain the impact of inter-category similarity
on typicality, but one can easily imagine extensions that include cue validities (the conditional
probability of a category given a feature).
A more important limitation of this model stems from the fact that the recognition procedure is
based on individual, presumably independent, category validities. For this reason, it has been called
the independent cue model of concepts. A number of authors (Smith &Medin, 1981; Medin, 1983;
Hanson & Bauer, 1989) point out that independent cue models are representationally incomplete,
since summation of individual weights limits recognition to linearly separable categories (Nilsson,
1965). More generally, independent cue models do not capture the feature correlations that are
necessary for completeness and to which humans seem naturally attuned (Mervis &Rosch, 1981;
Medin, 1983).
3.1.2 ALTERNATIVES TO INDEPENDENT CUE MODELS
The apparent inability of independent cue models to capture bundles of correlated features has
led to a number of alternative models. One way to k_*ep track of feature correlations is simply
to remember instances of a concept, since each instance can be viewed as a maximally-specific
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conjunction of features. This is the approach taken in ezemplar representations (Smith _ Medin,
1981). An example of this approach is Reed's (1972) proz_mity model, which retains an extensional
listing of a concept's known members, classifying a new object as a member of a category, Ck, if it
matches another member of Ck more closely than a member of a contrasting category.
A disadvantage of the proximity model is that retaining an extensional listing of known category
instances becomes expensive as the number of observations grows. In response, some systems (Aha
Kibler, 1989) selectively retain only certain useful observations. A simple strategy is to retain
only observations that resulted in a misclassification during learning. 4 Computational experiments
demonstrate this strategy's advantage in terms of storage, but they also show accuracy benefits,
presumably because idiosyncratic observations are ignored and thus are not used in classification.
In contrast to selective retention, Medin and Schsffer's (1978) contezt model supports a form
of abstraction through selective attention. In particular, the model allows that a subject may not
attend to a feature, effectively dropping the feature from an observation. Classification assumes that
a new instance matches in parallel again_st the stored exemplars of each contrasting category, causing
sufficiently matching exemplars to be retrieved; an assumption is that an exemplar is retrieved with
a probability proportional to the degree that it matches the observation. An observation is classified
with the first concept for which a specified number of exemplars is retrieved. Presumably, the
context model would account for typicality effects, since new typical instances would more closely
match the typical observations currently stored; thus, a criteria/number of retrieved exemplars
would tend to be reached more quickly for typical instances.
Nosofsky's (1987) gene_lized contezt model extends ideas of selective attention by allowing
features to be weighted. Aha and McNulty (1989) demonstrate how these weights can be learned
in a supervised task. Feature weights serve to divert attention away from uninformative features -
those distributed across members of many categories - and focus attention on informative features
in classification. This variable treatment of features can capture the importance of intra-category
and inter-category overlap, and adaptations should model a variety of typica_ty effects. 5
Another alternative class of models assume a relational cue representation, which generalizes
on the independent cue approach. Like their precursors, relational cue models maintain proba-
bilities (weights, confidence values) for individual features in concept descriptions, but they also
permit joint probabilities of larger feature configurations, such as P(Color=red ^ Size=large ^
Shape--sphere [Ck)). Syntactically, these models are also generalizations of exemplar models, since
an instance can be viewed as a conjunction of features. However, the representational power of
exemplar and relational cue models are theoretically equivalent, since one can use stored exemplars,
as needed, to compute all the information used in relational cue models.
4. All of the exemplar models that we have reviewed assumes a supervised learning scenario, but similar best-match
procedures for classification are used in the single-linkage clustering methods that we discussed in Section 2.2
(Everitt, 1980).
5. Feature weighting appears to serve a purpose that is similar to r_usous for feature weights in independent cue
models, but exemplar models do not force a category to be represented by a single summary description as do
single independent cue concepts.
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Table i. Linearlyseparable and nonlinearlyseparablecategories(Medin, 1983).
LINEARLY
SEPARABLE
OBJECTS
NON-
LINEARLY
SEPARABLE
OBJECTS
CATEGORY C1
v_ v2 Vs V4
1) 1 1 1 0
2) 1 0 I 1
3) 1 1 0 1
4) 0 1 1 I
9) 1 0 0 0
10) 1 0 1 0
11) 1 1 1 1
12) 0 1 1 1
CATEGORY C2
v_ v_ vs v4
5) I 0 1 0
6) 0 1 1 0
7) 0 0 0 1
8) I 1 0 0
13) 0 0 0 1
14) 0 1 0 0
15) 1 0 1 1
16) o o o o
One example of a relational cue model is Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth's (1977) property-set model,
which supposes that a feature conjunction is stored with a count of the observations in which it
occurred. A new observation is classified with the concept that contains the most 'diagnostic' con-
junction of features (i.e., the combination with the highest cue validity). The feature conjunction
for which P(Ckl(conjunction)) ismaximized (over all Ck) dictates that an observation that sat-
isfiesthe conjunction should be classifiedas a member of Ck. The property-set model stores the
frequencies needed to compute cue validities(rather than category validities)for allsinglefeatures
and conjunctions of features.
In many cases,a feature combination may be useless for classification;trivially,ifsmall objects
are equally splitbetween two classes,then smallness alone will give no help in classification.Thus,
a reasonable storage strategy would throw out feature conjunctions that do not aid classification
(e.g.,those with cue validitiesthat are roughly equal for all categories). This strategy has been
used for supervised learning by Anderson and Kline's (1979) ACT and by Schlimmer and Granger's
(1986) STAGGER, whereas Chalnick and Billman (1988) have used relationalcue representations for
concept formation. The latter system removes features that do not add to the informativeness of
a composite feature. Martin (1989) takes the opposite approach, adding features to a conjunction
only ifthey add to the informativeness of the conjunction.
3.1.3 PROBABILISTIC CONCEPT HIERARCHIES
Exemplar and relationalcue models both address a purported weakness of independent cue models
- their inabilityto explicitlycapture correlations between features. However, as we will show,
this limitation does not apply to network of independent cue representations. A combination of
such concepts has the same representational power as exemplar and relationalcue models. Similar
completeness arguments occur inthe literatureon neural computing (Nilsson,1965), where networks
of simple classifiers(e.g.,linear threshold units) can achieve representational completeness, even
though their components are severely limited.
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Linearly Separable
root
101X 011X 0001 11XX
Noniinearly Separable
root
XX11
A A
(2) (5) (4) (6) (1) (3) (8) (11) (12) (15)
C1 C2 Cl C2 Cl C1 C2 C1 C1 C2
10X0 (C1) 0XOX (C2)
(9) (10) (13) (14) (16)
C1 C1 C2 C2 C2
Figure i. Concept trees over nonlinearly and linearly separable categories.
As we have noted, concepts that are represented using independent cues are individually limited
to the recognition of linearly separable categories. Medin (1983) suggests that if independent
cue models are the basis of human conceptual structure, then in some cases linearly separable
categories should be easier to learn tlum nonlinearly separable ones. An investigation into this
question required that subjects learn, under supervision, one of the two category pairs displayed
in Table 1. Observations were characterized in terms of four binary-valued attributes, AI through
,44. Subjects judged the linearly separable set more difRcult to learn, and this set also resulted
in more recognition errors. Gluck, Bower, and Hee (1989) have accounted for similar data with a
relational cue model in which pairwise composite cues are used to convert the nonlinearly separable
categories to linearly separable categories. This transformation makes the concept easier to learn
in composite-cue space than the orig_aal linearly separable categories.
An alternative account of these d_ta exploits the notion of probabilistic concept hierarchies. Con-
sider the concept trees of Figure 1, which discriminate the category pairs of Medin's experiments, e
An independent cue model insists that each node divides the total set of observations into linearly
separable categories. However, this division need not correspond to the sets that were taught,
CI and C2. Rather, like a decision tree (Quinlan, 1986) or discrimination network (Feigenbaum,
1963; Kolodner, 1983; Felgenbaum & Simon, 1984), members of a given class may reside in distinct
portions of the hierarchy.
One can think of tree construction as being guided by the simple heuristic of grouping objects
having the most features in common. The actual method used to form the hierarchies in the figure
is more complicated (as described in Section 3.2), but the simplification is consistent with this
technique and with intuitions about independent cue representations. The trees reveal that several
atypical members of GI in the linearly separable set share many properties with C2 and vice versa.
Thus, these similar items are reasonably placed within the same mid_e-level nodes of the hierarchy.
Observation 7 is quite unlike any other instance, placing it in a separate category. On the other
hand, there are fairly specific patterns that perfectly discriminate many members of contrasting
6. For simpliclty, the concepts lot the nodes in Figure 1 lureabbreviated by = pattern (e.g., IO1X) thst is common
to all category (node) members; 'X' denotes an a.ttfibute in which no single value is common to sl/members.
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categories in the nonlinear domain. Medin's finding can be explained in terms of the average depth
to which observations must be classified before one can perfectly distinguish members of C1 from
C2. The linearly separable set requires an average depth of 1.87 before reaching a node that contains
only members of one category; in contrast, the nonlinearly separable set has 1.37 as its average
depth.
Our demonstration is simplified, but it nonetheless illustrates that hierarchies or other networks
of independent cue concepts have the same representational power as exemplar and relational cue
models. Linearly separable representations direct classification to deeper levels of the tree until a
perfect discrimination can be made. In addition to their representational strength, hierarchies offer
efficiency advantages. A tree structure allows recognition to occur in logarithmic time as a function
of stored observations, rather than in linear or exponential time, as it does for some alternatives.
We now turn our attention to heuristics for guiding the formation of such concept hierarchies,
focusing on the evidence for preferred concepts in human memory.
3.2 Basic-Level Effects and Concept Quality
Psychologicalstudieshave shown that,withinhierarchicalclassificationschemes, there appears to
be a basiclevelpreferredby human subjects.For example, in a hierarchycontaining {animal,
vertebrate,mammal, dog, collie},subjectbehavior may indicatethat 'dog'liesat the basiclevel.
Rosch, Mervis,Gray,Johnson, and Boyes-Braem (1976)used a targetrecognitiontaskto show that
subjectsare quickerto confirmthat a testitem isa member ofsuch a basiccategory than they are
fora superordinateor subordinatecategory.In a forcednaming task (Rosch etal.,1976;Jolicoeur,
Gluck, & Kosslyn, 1984),a subjectisshown a pictureof a particularitem and asked to respond
with itsidentity.
3.2.1 EARLY MEASURES FOR PREDICTING THE BASIC LEVEL
The identificationfpreferredconceptsinhumans must constrainany model ofhuman classification,
and it may alsoprovide a basis for principledmeasures of concept qualityfor use in concept
formationby human and machine. Infact,researchershave proposed anumber ofmeasures designed
to predictthe basiclevel.An earlyproposal (Rosch et al.,1976) postulated that a basic-level
category m_es the totalcue validity/of a category over featuresthat are shared by allor
most members of the category(i.e.,only featureswith high categoryvalidity).This can be stated
formallyas
Y]jP(C_]P_) forfeaturesVj such that P(Vj[Ck) _ 1.0
Rosch et al.did not specifyhow closeto unitya categoryvaliditymust come beforeitisincluded
in the calculationof totalcue validity.
Jones (1983)has proposed anothermeasure, calledcollocation,thatdirectlyincorporatescategory
validityintothe predictionofbasiclevel.This functioncan be statedas
collocation(l_,Ck) = P(Ck]l_)P(l_[Ck)
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He argued that a basic-level node (e.g., bird) has more collocation.maximizing values among its
ancestral-related nodes (e.g., animal, robin) than concepts at other levels. Neither Rosch nor Jones
compared their measures' predictions against experimental results, but both suggested that the
basic level maximizes a tradeoff between cue and category validities over descriptive features.
3.2.2 CATEGORY UTILITY
The notion of a tradeoff is also important to a third measure that has been proposed to predict
basic-level categories (Corter _ G1uck, 1985; Gluck L, Corter, 1985). This function, called category
utility, can be developed from a weighted variation on the collocation measure:
__, P(V_ )PC CkI_ )P(VjlC, D , (1)
J
where P(_) weights the contribution of individual feature collocations by the base rate of the
respective feature. In essence, this measure reflects the importance of increasing cue and category
validities for more frequently occurring features.
However, Corter and Gluck did not express category utility as an extension to collocation. Rather,
they devised it with the idea that basic-level categories are preferred because they best facilitate
predictions about observations in the environment. In their view, category utility is a function of
a category's prediction potential, or
PCCk)E(number of correctly predicted  lck) ,
which is a tradeoff between the ezpected number of features that can be correctly predicted about a
member of a category Ck and the proportion of the environment P(Ck) to which those predictions
apply.
Assuming a probability matching strategy for prediction (Bruner, Goodnow, H Austin, 1956),
the expectation can be further formalized by noting that one can predict a feature with probability
P(Vj]Ck), and that this prediction will be correct with the same probability:
P(Ck) _ P(_lCk) 2 (2)
J
Clearly, a probability mazimizing strategy (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956) has advantages in
actually generating predictions. However, it is important to realize that it is not superior in terms of
heuristically ordering categories in terms of prediction potential, which is the intent behind category
utility. In fact, there are important advantages to assuming a probability-matching strategy when
forming categories, as detailed by Fisher (1987a).
Simple algebraic manipulations show the equivalence of functions (1) and (2). Thus, category
utility can be viewed as s tradeofl" between cue and category validity, as well as a function that
measures a category's prediction potential. More intuitively, these views can be unified by noting
that the P(_ICk) term reflects the importance of categories with predictable features (Tversky,
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1977; Lebowitz, 1982; Kolodnex, 1983), but that features must also be predictive or discriminating
of a category (Tvexsky, 1977; Lebowitz, 1982; Kolodnex, 1983), so that a one can classify an instance
and access predictable features. Finally, Cortex and Cluck (1985) define category utility as the
increase in the expected number of features that can be correctly predicted, given knowledge of a
category, over the expected number of correct predictions without such knowledge. The expression
cu(c, ) = P(Ck)[ - P(Vj)
J J
provides a forms] statement of their complete definition of the category utility CU.
(3)
3.2.3 PROPERTIES OF CATEGORY UTILITY
There are severalpropertiesof categoryutilitythat are worth mentioning at thispoint.First,the
measure has the desirableproperty that itwillbe zeroifallfeaturedistributionsare independent
ofmembership in a category.That is,if
P(_ICk) = e(_) ,
then
p(p_lCt)2_ p(p_)2 = 0 ,
and P_ willbe 'irrelevant'o a category'sscoreand presumably to an observation'smembership in
Ck. If all such features are independent, then CU(Ck) = O.
Second, category utility is not a function of feature correlations, but categories that capture
featurecorrelationswilltend to have higherscoresfor thismeasure. If category C'k captures a
correlationbetween N features,then the sum ofthe individualcategoryvaliditieswillbe higherthan
ifthe correlationiscapturedonlyin partornot atall.This propertyhas important implicationsfor
the processofconcept formation,in thatitletsone capturefeatureintercorrelationswithout their
'direct'computation. Rather than computing P(VI A V2 A ...A Vn) explicitly,concept formation
can introducea categoryC_ that convertsthe taskof computing P(VI A V2 A... A VnlCk) to one of
computing P(Ck) I'I_=iP(ViICk)•In words, C_ isan auxiliaryvariablethatmay leadto conditional
independence among some features(Pearl,1985).
To see thispoint,considerthe hierarchiesof Figure 1,which were formed using category utility
as a decisionheuristic.Note thatthe term P(ViICk) equals1.0forthosefeaturesshown withineach
middle-levelcategory.Trivially,the distributionsof thesefeaturesare conditionallyindependent of
other featureswithinthe same class.Nodes in the treetend tocapture distinctsetsof correlated
features;the probabilityof each conjunctionof featuresshown at a node issimply the probability
of the category,P(Ck), sinceI'I_=IP(P_ICk) = I'I'_=I1.0 = 1.0.These computations may not be
so cleaninother domains, but one can nonethelessefficientlyand effectivelycompute such feature
correlationsthrough the interactionof concept hierarchiesand an independent cue heuristic.
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3.3 Summary
To summarize, psychological findings indicate that there are important constraints on the repre-
sentation and access of concepts. In particular, typicality effects suggest that classical concept
representations are untenable in many situations, since some category members receive preferential
treatment. We have advanced probabilistic concept hierarchies as a representation scheme that
supports these preferences, in which features vary in their contribution to family resemblance and
classification. Furthermore, tree-structured probabilistic concepts are representationally complete;
they do not suffer from the limitations of independent cue concepts in isolation, such as a restriction
to linearly separable categories.
In addition to intra-category preferences implied by typicality rankings, basic-level effects suggest
that humans also give preferential treatment to certain categories over others. These preferences
can be predicted in static memory structures by measures like category utility. However, these same
human preferences undoubtedly play a significant role in concept learning, as well as retrieval. This
supposition is supported by studies (11osch et al., 1976) which indicate that basic-level categories
are learned before either subordinate or superordinate categories. We now describe the manner
in which predictors of human categorization preferences can be adapted to the task of concept
learning and classification.
4. A Model of Concept Retrieval and Learning
In this section we describe COBWEB (Fisher, 1987a, 19871)), a concept formation system that adapts
category utility to the task of concept learning and recognition. Our initial motivation for using
category utility was that it rewards categories that improve prediction, a characteristic made evi-
dent by Gluck and Corter's analysis. Thus, this section's perspective is primarily computational,
but rational (Anderson, in press) and speculative (Hall _k Kibler, 1985) analyses posit that compu-
tational and psychological concerns are not independent. In Section 5, we expand our discussion
to selected psychological findings.
We will describe COBW]_B in terms of the search framework that we presented earlier. Conve-
niently, one can easily transform category utility from a characteristic function of static concept
hierarchies to a heuristic _uide for concept learning. In particular, one can partition a known set
of observations into contrasting categories, C_, so as to m_miT.e the average ut/lity of categories
in the partition or
c (ck)
where n is the number of categories in the partition. Because category utility requires only in/orma-
tion about individual feature distributions within each Ck, one can effectively represent a category
with an independent cue representation, where each feature, _, is weighted by P(Vj[Ck).
Figure 2 illustrates that contrasting categories can be organized under a root node whose features
are weighted by applicable base rate probabilities, P(Tv_[root)_ P(_v_). In this case, observations
correspond to the voting records of U.S. congresspersons on key issues with values of 'yea' or
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Root
(U.S Representatives)
Party=Dem(0.98)
Party=Rep(0.02)
Immigration=yea(0.41 )
Test-Ban=yea(0.9)
F ree- Exports=yea(0.65)
Party=Dem(0.6)
Party=Rep(0.4)
Immigration=yea(0.49)
Test- Ban=yea(0.86)
Party=Dem(0.88) [
Immigration=yea(0.71 )
Test-Ban-yea(0.86)
Free-Exports=yea(0.17)
Party=Dem(0.19)
Party=Rep(0.81 )
Immigration-yea(0.58)
Test-Ban=yea(0.81 )
Figure 2. A sample probabilistic concept hierarchy over congressional voting records.
'nea' (Lebowitz, 1987). T In addition, we assume that each category is weighted by the proportion
of observations, P(Ck), classified under it. By definition P(root) = 1.0. CoIlectiveiy, P(Ck)'s,
P(Vj)'s, and P(_[Ck)'s supply the requisite information for calculating category utility.
Conceptually, the easiest way to find an optim_ set of contrasting categories is to exhaustively
search the possible partitions of the known observations. This can proceed in a manner similar
to the specific-to-general search that we described earlier: given a partition over rn observations,
consideration of the rn + 1st observation generates rn new partitions, each the resuit of placing
the observation into one of the existing categories. In addition, there is an rn + 1st partition that
results from creating a new singleton category that contains only the new observation. The search
for the best partition ceases when one encounters the last observation; one can then identify the
partition with the best average category utility from among the alternatives. At this point, one can
simply return the best partition or one may further decompose each category of the best partition
by recursive/y applying the exhaustive search procedure over the subset of observations that are
classified by the category. This recursive procedure results in a tree of probabilistic concepts.
This exhaustive approach is clearly impractical, since the procedure requires that one examine
alternative partitions that grow exponentially with the number of observations. Search is reduced
significantly in systems like CLUSTER/2 by maintaining a fixed number of alternatives after each
observation. The hill-climbing approach described in Section 2.3 restricts the number of alternative
partitions that are maintained to one. In particular, FiBber's (1987a, 1987b) COBWEB assimilates
an rn + 1st observation by evaluating the partitions that result by adding the observation to each
existing category and the partition that results from creating a new singleton category. It then
7. We only list 'yea' v,dues on _.lected votes, but all features" with nonsero probability at a node axe stored at the
node.
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Leazning curves for three attributes in the congressional domain.
evaluates each of these alternatives using category utility and retains the best choice. If the instance
is incorporated into an existing category, then the observation is assimi]ated into the respective
subtree by the same procedure, s Anderson (in press) has recently described a similar approach, in
which a Bayesian measure guides the incremental assimilation of new observations.
As with assimilation, COBWEB also uses category utility to guide object recognition: an ob-
servation is sorted down a path of 'best matching' categories to a leaf, at which point the new
observation may be recognized as matching the leaf. For example, consider the congressional rot-
ink records classified by the tree of Figure 2. A new voting record oi" unknown political party may
be recognized (perhaps incorrectly) as an instance of the political party of the best-matching leaf.
As we discussed in relation to linearly separable categories, this strategy lets category members be
distributed throughout the tree, and not restricted to one node of the tree.
l_.ecognition need not be limited to any particttlar category label (e.g., party), so that one can
predict any unknown feature in this manner. This capability can be tested systematicaJ]y by mea-
suring predictive accuracy at intermittent points in the evolution of a prohabilistic tree. The system
is presented each 'test' item with one or more attributes removed, it sorts the incomplete obser-
vation to the 'best-matching' leaf of the concept hierarchy, and it predicts the missing attributes
based on those in the leaf. This occurs for all attributes of all test items, thus yielding an accuracy
level for each attribute. The graph of Figure 3 shows sample 'learning curves' for the attributes
POLITICAL PAItTY, IMMIGItATION-VOTE, and SATELLITE-TEST-BAN.
In general, prediction accuracy for an attribute is closely related to the attribute's inter-correlation
with other attributes of the domain. Political party is highly correlated with other attributes,
whereas a congressman's vote on an immigration bill is relatively uncorrelated with other features.
These data support earlier claims that category utility captures correlations in the data when cou-
pled with appropriate learning mechanisms. Similar findings hold for other natural domains and
for artificial domains in which one can systematically vary the amount of intercorrelation (Fisher,
8. ConwEs only handles nom_-ny-vsIued attributes, but Gennsxi, Lansley, and Fisher (1989) describe CLXSSST, a
descendent of COBWEB that mumes continuou_y-vnlued attributes.
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1987a, 1987b; Gennari, Langley, & Fisher, 1989). Not surprisingly, in domains with very little
inter-correlation, the learning rate and the asymptotic accuracy suffers greatly. For some features,
the system's predictive ability may even be worse than chance.
The reason for COBWES's poor behavior with respect to some features is that classification to a
leaf often simulates a probability-matching strategy (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956). Viewed
in statistical terms, sorting to a leaf may overfit the data. Recall from Section 3.2 that category
utility has the desirable property that features which are independent of category membership will
not influence classification at deeper levels, since P(I_ICk) _ - p(_)2 = 0. Inversely, an attribute's
independence should also signal that deeper classification will not aid prediction of the attribute.
Thus, one should follow a probability maximizing strategy at an appropriate point in classification.
Several heuristics for identifying points of approximate feature independence and points of optimal
prediction (Quinlan, 1986; Fisher, 1989) have produced significant advantages in terms of prediction
accuracy.
Our summary of COBWEB has been brief, in part because the precise nature of the learning
operators is of limited relevance to the forthcoming discussion. Rather, the important assumptions
are that memory is organized into probabilistic concept hierarchies and in a manner that is guided
by category utility. This section has illustrated that one can carry out the process incrementally
and in a manner that seems consistent with many aspects of human learning (Simon, 1969; Langley,
Gennari, & Iba, 1987; Anderson, in press). However, as described here, COBWEB's hill-climbing
learning method exhibits ordering effects that we have detailed elsewhere, along with simulated
backtracking mechanisms that mitigate the effect (Fisher, 1987a, 1987b; Gennari, Langley, & Fisher,
1989). Finally, our evaluation of COBWEB has been in terms of prediction accuracy of features and
category labels. This is an important evaluation criterion in machine learning, but one that is
intimately related to the psychological literature on recognition (e.g., Feigenbaum, 1963). We will
now investigate the psychological plausibility of our methods for recognition, classification, and
prediction.
5. An Analysis of Memory Phenomena
In this section we extend our analysis of COBWEB and category utility to a number of psychological
phenomena. Our discussion is very much in line with Anderson's (in press) rational analysis of
cognition. In effect, Gluck and Corter's derivation of category utility stemmed from the prescription
that categories facilitate accurate prediction. We open the section by introducing some conventions
that are important in our analysis of the basic level, typicality, and fan effect data that follow.
5.1 Category Match
A common thread in each of the psychological studies that we examine is the use of subject response
time to queries about experimental stimuli. For example, subjects might be required to verify that
a stimulus is a member of a previously learned category. This section illustrates that response time
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Figure 4. Approximation of a tree from Hoffman and Ziessier's (1983) basic-level studies.
in each of these studies is well predicted by a simple variation of category utility that is only a
function of the features occurring in the observation (stimulus) being classified:
P(Ck) _"_[P(_ICs=) 2- p(_)2] ,
J
for Vj present in the observation. We will call this category match because it intuitively corresponds
to the degree that an observation matches a category and the extent to which that category is
activated during recognition. The measure also fits Tversky's (1977) model of category-object
resemblance, in that it is a function of category size (P(Ck)) and sums over the features that 'agree'
and 'conflict'. ° If the amount of conflict between features outweighs the amount of agreement then
category match will be negative; trivially, if an observation has a feature that is not present in any
category member, then P(V'IC ) = 0.0 and P(VIC) _ - P(V) 2 < O.
Intuitively, category match corresponds to activation strength, which we might assume to be
inversely related to response time (Collins & Loftus, 1975). However, this section will concentrate
primarily on the predictive (or descriptive) links between category match and human response
time. That category match turns out to be a good predictor of response time is not strongly tied
to particular 'implementation' details (e.g., the precise nature of the classification procedure), but
relies only on general assumptions about memory organization: that probabilistic concepts are
hierarchically organized in a manner that is guided by category utility, l° There will be exceptions
to this section's exclusion of 'implementation' detail, but only on occasions when it seems most
productive to explain counterintuitive findings. We will more thoroughly discuss how the predictions
9. Most often there will not be perfect agreement or contiict between an observation's feature _nd a category's
feature distributions. RAther, the amount of agreement sad conflict is weighted. Had--ikadic and Yun (1989)
use a measure of similar intent in their INC system, but relevance is only computed over features shared by the
observation sad class. Computer experiments by Fisher (1987) indicate th&t classification and learning behavior
using category match closely approximate the behavior of the full category utility measure, with differences only
occurring very early in tra_ing.
I0. In fact, this is a desirable characteristic that is enforced by methodologies for system development that segregate
stages of specificatwn, design, sad imp|ementation. Within cognitive science, these stages are roughly analogous
to Mart's (1982) three levels of description for information proce_ng systems.
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Table 2. The encoded tree from Hoffman and Ziessler (1983).
SUPERORDINATE
ToP-I
TOP-2
BASIC LEVEL
MIDDLE-1
MIDDLE-2
MIDDLE-3
MIDDLE-4
SUBORDINATE [J OUTER INSIDE BOTTOM
LEAF-1
LEAF-2
LEAF-3
LEAr-4
LZA_-5
LEA_-6
LEAF-7
LEAF-8
0 0 0
0 0 1
1 2 2
1 2 3
1 3 0
1 3 1
0 4 2
0 4 3
of category match can be implemented by the classificationmechanisms of a CoBWEB-like system
in Section 6, but for now we turn our attention to the predictive merits of category match with
respect to basic level,typicality,and fan effectphenomena.
5.2 Basic-Level Effects
Gluck and Corter (1985) verifiedthat category utilitypredicted the basic levelin two experimental
studies (Hoffman & Ziessler,1983; Murphy & Smith, 1982): a basic-levelcategory maximizes
category utilityamong itsancestors and descendents. In a study by Hoffman and Ziessler,subjects
learned a classificationtree over 'nonsense' objects like the one shown in Figure 4. Each category
(node) had a 'nonsense' name that subjects used to identify category membership in recognition
tasks. Objects were defined in terms of three attributes: the shape of the INSIDE subcomponent
with values SQUARE, TRIANGLE, STAR, or CIRCLE (encoded as 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively); the
OUTER shape, with (encoded) values of 0 and 1; and the shape of the BOTTOM, with values 0, 1, 2,
and 3. Table 2 shows the encoding of the Hoffman and Ziesslerdata that was assumed by Corter
and Gluck. For the tree of Figure 4, subjects consistently 'preferred'level two (where the root is
at levelzero).
To account for the order in which subjects verify category membership, we use the category
match measure. Figure 4 shows the match scores of several categories (nodes) obtained for the
observation (OUTER -- 0, BOTTOM -- 0, INSIDE = 0}. The appropriate basic-levelcategory is the
most highly rated, with category match indicating a negative score for some categories for which
the observation isnot a member. Intuitively,a negative score indicates that an observation and
a category's feature distributions conflictmore than they agree. This simulation assumes that
classificationoccurs with respect to the tree that subjects are explicitlytaught, and that a verbal
indication of the target category activates a corresponding node in the tree. When classification
via the perceptual cues of a pictured observation reach the verbally signifiednode, the observation
isidentifiedas a member of the target.
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Table 3. Our encoding of the Murphy and Smith (1982) tree.
SUPERORDINATE BASIC LEVEL SUBORDINATE IIHANDLE SHAFT HEAD
11
TOP-1
TOP-2
MIDDLE-1
MIDDLE-2
MIDDLE-3
MIDDLE-4
SUB-I
SUE-2
SUE-3
SUE-4
SUE-5
SUB-6
SUB-7
SUE-8
SIZE
2 2 0 0, I
2 2 1 0, I
0 3 3 O, I
I 3 3 O, 1
3 4 4 0, I
3 4 5 O, 1
4 0 6 O, 1
4 1 6 O, I
HoiTman and Ziessler also explored two other trees over the same objects of Figure 4. One variant
resulted by placing nodes Middle-1 and Middle-4 under the same top-level node and Middie-2 and
Mid_e-3 under the same top node. In this variant subjects treated the top nodes as basic, but
category match predicts a tie between the top and midd]e nodes in this tree - middle and top nodes
each match their respective observations with a score of 0.469. This is similar to the predictions
found by Gluck and Cotter with the full category utility measure. In Section 6 we speculate on a
resolution to this tie that involves selectively 'masking' -nlnformative features in the category match
computation. A third tree was also used by Hoffman and Ziessler in which subjects regarded the
bottommost level of leaves to be basic. As with the tree of Figure 4, the basic level is unambiguously
identified by category match.
Gluck and Cotter also evaluated category utility in light Of experiments by Murphy and Smith
(1982). Once again, in this study subjects were trained to recoEndze instances of categories arranged
hierarchically. In these experiments objects were abstract 'tools' that varied along four perceptual
dimensions (tool size and the types of hancUe, shaft, and head). Categories were assigned nonsense
names of equal length, and target recognition studies behaviorally identified one level as basic. In
addition, Murphy and Smith also looked at 'false' cases, in which an observation was not a member
of the given target. In each of the false cases, a test item from a different superorclinate category
than the target concept was selected. Data from the true cases support previous findings on basic-
level preference, but they found that subjects showed some tendency, although not statistical]y
significant, to more quickly reject the 'false' cases as members of subordinate target categories than
basic targets.
Table 4 summarizes the average subject response times and category match scores in the true
and false cases. In the true cases we report category match of an observation with each category to
which it belongs. In the false case, the match between an observation and unrelated superordinate,
basic, and subordinate targets are reported. In both the true and false cases, category match
correctly predicts response time orders: as category match increases response time decreases. In
the false cases all category match scores are negative because'there is no feature overlap between
a test observation and target concept. In fact, the difference, P(VIC) 2 - P(V) 2, is equal for all
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TaMe 4. Average response times (Murphy & Smith, 1982) and category match rankings.
SUPERO RDINATE
BASIC LEVEL
SUBORDINATE
TRUE CASES FALSE CASES
RESPONSE CATEGORY RESPONSE CATEGORY
TIME MATCH TIME MATCH
879MS 0.21 882MS --0.070
678MS 0.53 714MS --0.035
723MS 0.36 691MS --0.018
categories in the false case; the difference in false category match scores is due solely to the P(C)
term of category match, which magnifies the negative difference for higher level categories. We have
no strong hypothesis regarding these data, other than to suggest that when no featural connections
exist between an observation and a category, as is the case here, it is reasonable to assume that any
search of the category membership proceeds in time proportional to the category's size as reflected
in P(C).
Murphy and Smith performed a second experiment intended to expand their findings about
subordinate recognition in the false case. In particular, they reported response times for cases in
which the observation was not a member of the subordinate target, but (1) was a member of the
same basic category, (2) was a member of the same superordinate category, but not the same basic
category, and (3) was not a member of the same superordinate category. These cases vary the
'relatedness' of the target and observation, with (1) being the most related of the false cases and
case (3) being totally unrelated. Table 5 shows the response times, which indicate that items of
the same basic category require greater time to reject than the other two cases.
To explain their findings, Murphy and Smith propose a preparation model of classification and
category structure. In this model, a verbal cue activates the target category and its 'conceptual'
definition. Recognition occurs by summing the number of concept features that match an obser-
vation, as well as the number of conflicting features. An observation is accepted or rejected as a
category member when a concept-specific 'threshold' is reached. Separate thresholds are presumed
for acceptance and rejection. Like the preparation model, our application of category match is
effectively a summing procedure. However, our category match data and our earlier discussion of
classification in systems such as COBWEB suggests a different view of true and false recognition.
To motivate our processing assumptions consider the category match scores in Table 5. The
negative category match scores accurately predict no difference between the unrelated and same-
superordinate case, but a positive score is shown for the same-basic condition. This violates our
assumption that category match and response time are inversely related, since subordinate rejection
required the longest response time. To maintain consistency we must assume that match scores on
opposite sides of zero are inverted in their relation to response time. In addition, we posit that a
category match of zero (or less) may be regarded as a category-independent cause for rejecting an
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Table5.Averageresponsetimes(Murphy & Smith,1982)and categorymatch rankingson falsedatawith
varyingdegreesofrelatedness.
DISTINCT SUPERORDINATE
SAME SUPERORDINATE
SAME BASIC
RESPONSE CATEGORY
TIME MATCH
691MS --0.018
687MS --0.018
902MS +0.232
observation.Intuitively,thisisdesirablebecause a negativescoresuggestsgreatermismatch than
match offeatures.
Conversely,we arealsoconcerned with criteriaforsuccessfulclassification.Systems likeCOBWEB
assume thatan observationisclassifiedwith the categorythat mazirn{zesactivation.We assumed
in discussingthe Hoffman and Ziesslerstudiesthat successfultargetrecognitionoccurred when
activationthat was triggeredby perceptual cues reached a verbally-activatedtargetnode; this
suggeststhat recognitionisnot simply a processof directcomparison between targetdefinition
and observationas the preparationmodel suggests,but ismediated by other memory elements.
Our views of successand failurein recognitionare unifiablewhen one considersthat categories
along the path to a targetmay induce conditionalindependence with respect to featuresthat
are common to allor many subordinates.Category match's subtractionof base rate probabilities
insuresthatsuch featureshave no impact on classification,but an observation'sremaining features
may conflictwith a concept and resultin a negativematch at that levelof classification.Thus,
our view isthat the best matching node in memory definesa variable'threshold'that cannot be
achievedby any contrastingcategory.Competing categoriesare removed as candidateswhen their
conditionalmatches drop below a category-independentthresholdof zero. Our analysispredicts
thatthe subordinatecategory of Table 5 isrejectedmore slowlybecause itspositivescorerequires
thatit'compete'with contrastingcategoriesforsome periodof time.
In summary, a qualitative characterization that captures all of the false response times (i.e.,
Tables 4 and 5) is that they vary proportionally to the absolute value of category match. In
contrast, response times for true cases vary inversely with category match. More generally, we
suggest that category-specific thresholds are not required in the false or true cases. Instead, positive
and maximizing activation strength may be the sole determinant of categorization.
5.3 Typicality Effects
Our discussionhas replicatedGluck and Corter'sanalysisofbasic-leveleffectswith categorymatch
and extended ittoMurphy and Smith's'false'data.In thissectionwe extend theirrationalanalysis
of categorystructurefurtherby using categorymatch to predicttypicalityeffectsin probabilistic
trees.To review briefly,typicalitystudiesindicatethat,in'additionto the between-categorypref-
erencessuggestedby basic-leveleffects,humans alsoexhibitpreferenceswithin categories.
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A
B
Table 6. Nonsense strings used by Rosch and Mervis (1975) to test typicality differences.
(A)
LETTER INTRA-CATEG. TYPICALITY
STRING OVERLAP
JXPHM Low Low
QBLFS Low Low
XPHMQ MEDIUM MEDIUM
MQBLF MEDIUM MEDIUM
PHMQB HIGH HIGH
HMQBL HIGH HIGH
CTRVG
TRVGZ
RVGZK
VGZKD
GZKDW
ZKDWN
(B)
LETTER INTER-CATEG. TYPICALITY
STRING OVERLAP
HPNWD Low HIGH
HPC6B Low HIGH
A HPNSJ MEDIUM MEDIUM
4KC6D MEDIUM MEDIUM
GKNTJ HIGH Low
4KCTG HIGH Low
8SJKT
8SJ3G
B 9UJCG
4UZC9
4UZRT
MSZR5
5.3.1 TYPICALITY AND INTRA-CATEGORY SIMILARITY
To demonstrate consistencywith typicalityeffects,we willfocuson studiesby Rosch and Mervis
(1975).Their experimentsdemonstrate thattypicalityincreaseswith the number offeaturesshared
with other objectsof the same category and variesinverselywith the number of featuresshared
with members of contrastingclasses.In theirstudy ofintra-categoryinfluences,Rosch and Mervis
used the 'nonsense'stringsin Table 6 (a).Members of categoryA variedin the extentthat they
overlapwith other members of the same class.For example, the symbols of 'QBLFS' appeared in
an average of 2.0 other stringsof category A, whereas the symbols of 'HMQBL' were shared by
3.2 other members of categoryA. The inter-classoverlapbetween members of A and B was held
constant (i.e.,there was no overlap).After subjectslearned to distinguishcategoriesA and B,
the average time to classifyletterstringsas members of A or B was determined. Response time
decreasedas the amount ofintra-categoryoverlapincreased,supportingthe hypothesisthattypical
instancessharedmore propertieswith othermembers ofthe same class.
To analyze the Rosch and Mervis data itis important to distinguishthe task performed by
subjectsin typicalityexperimentsfrom the basic-levelstudiespresentedearlier.In the target
recognitiontasksitappears that categorymatch appliedto the targetconcept isa good predictor
ofresponsetime ranking,but unlikethe basic-levelstudies,Rosch and Mervis did not givesubjects
a targetcategoryforwhich membership had to be verifiedor rejected;they requiredthat subjects
predictthe membership of an observation.Thus, assumptions about the portionsof memory that
may be examined duringclassificationare lessclear.For thisreasonour analysiswillfocus on two
strategiesofrepresentationthatmight reasonablybe used toencode the typicalitystimuliby human
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M(1.0)
J(0.33)
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Root
Class=A(1.0)
M(0.83)
S(0.167)
Class=A(0.5)
Class=B(0.5)
Q(0.417)
S(0.083)
Class=A(1.0) ]Q(1.0)sio.33)
_ _ HM_t.
Class=B(1.0)
G(0.83)
C(0.1 67)
Figure 5. A concept hierarchy that summarizes the intrs.category overlap data.
subjects; by considering two alternative encodings we hope to better illustrate the robustness oi"
category match as a predictor of response time.
The first strategy, which we term local, assumes that each category is associated with a dis-
tinct independent cue concept; this is shnilar to our assumptions in the basic-level studies. An
observation is classified with the category that m,LYimi,.es category match in time that is inversely
proportional to the match score. A second strategy is inspired by a general processing assumption
discussed in relation to the Murphy and Smith data: recognition effects are mediated by concepts in
memory other than the target or, in this case, the possible targets. A dL_tr_buted strategy assumes
that category members may be distributed throughout memory. This was an important assump-
tion behind our discussion of linearly separable categories in Section 3 and prediction accuracy in
Section 4. In a distributed representation, externally-defined categories need not correspond to
nodes in memory, but external-category 'features' or labels can be used to predict the membership
of an observation. In modeling this strategy, we use COBWEB to organize the strings of the Rosch
and Mervis studies, thereby simulating a subject's training phase. A test item's external-category
membership is predicted at the concept tree node that maximizes category match and at which a
prediction of external-category membership can be made with certainty (i.e., an external category
label has a probability of 1.0 at the node). Time is assumed to be inversely proportional to the
category match score of this node. 11
Table 7 (a) shows response times for category A test items and category match scores for local
and distributed representations. Because COBWEB is sensitive to input order, the distributed
representation scores are averaged over 20 trees constructed from random orderings of the data
strings. A representative tree for these data is shown in Figure 5. Since there is no overlap between
II. We could have also given a distributed account of buic-level dat_, in which superordinate, buic, and subordinate
category labels may be distributed throughout a prob_bilktic concept hierarchy. In general, basic-level findings
from a distributed account are consistent with human data. However, an unexplained implication of this account
is that a superordinate label can be predicted with certainty at any node that a basic label can be predicted,
apparently lea_ling to equal response times. Section 6 discusses a resolution of this issue.
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Table 7. Average response times and category match rankings for Roseh and Mervis (1975) data.
RESPONSE
TXME
CATEGORY
MATCH
(LOCAL)
CATEGORY
MATCH
(COBWEB)
INTRA- HIGH 560MS 0.948 0.910
CATEGORY MEDIUM 617MS 0.823 0.832
OVERLAP (*) LOW 692MS 0.594 0.736
INTER- Low 909MS 0.306 0.488
CATEGORY MEDIUM 986MS 0.196 0.461
OVERLAP (B) HIGH 1125MS 0.120 0.396
classesA and B, COBWEB's approach ofgrouping similarobjectsalmost alwaysresultsinthe same
categories(atthe top level)as thosebased solelyon the externallabel;12recallthat thesetopmost
nodes are alsothe two concepts consideredin the localrepresentation.In addition,the top-most
node generallymaximizes the categorymatch scoresof the high and medium intra-overlapdata,
thusexplainingthe similarityofcategorymatch scoresforthesedata usingthe localand distributed
representations.In contrast,low intra-overlapitems exhibitmarkedly highercategorymatch scores
using a distributedrepresentation.This reflectsthe factthatlow intra-overlapobservationsin this
experiment more oftenmatch a subordinatenode in the treebetterthan they match the top-level
node. Our assumption isthatclassificationwillbe more rapid with respectto the subordinate.
Regardlessofwhether one assumes a localordistributedrepresentation,categorymatch scoresare
inverselyrelatedto responsetime. Intuitively,featuresthat are relativelyunique among category
A members willcause a decreasein categorymatch fortheirrespectiveobservationsbecause they
have smallerP(VIC )valuesforthesefeatures.Conversely,the P(V[C) valuesforunique features
willbe higher at subordinatenodes, thus increasingcategory match at lower nodes, even to the
point ofoffsettingthe reduced P(C) values.
5.3.2 TYPICALITY AND INTER-CATEGORY SIMILARITY
In addition to varying intra-categoryoverlap,Rosch and Mervis explored the impact of inter-
category (between-category)similarity.Table 6 (b) shows the stimulifor thisstudy, in which
subjectswere taught to distinguishcategoriesA and B. Intra-categoryoverlapwas held constant
forcategoryA members, but the averageextentto which categoryA members overlapped with B
variedfrom 0.0 ('HPNWD') to 1.3('4KCTG'). As Table 7 (b)indicates,categoryA instancesthat
shared few symbols with stringsin categoryB were recognizedmore quickly(i.e.,were treatedas
more typical).
12. At times atypical members of A (or B) may be placed in distinct categories.
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4DC64
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Figure 6. Tree constructed over inter.category experimental data.
Once again, we used two representation strategies in testing the relationship between category
match predictions and the response time data. For these stimuli, significant featural overlap between
certain members of A and B caused COBWEB to consistently distribute class A members throu_out
the resultant concept hierarchy. Figure 6 shows one such tree. In this case, the most stronsly
indicated node may not allow a prediction of category membership to be made with certainty and
alternative nodes must be examined. For example, node nt of the tree of Figure 6 does not allow
an unambiguous prediction of A or B membership. In this case, the category match score of node
n2 would have to be used when classifying '4KCTG'.
Table 7 (b) reveals that, in the case of both local and distributed representations, category
match scores were again inversely related to Rosch and Mervis' response time data. Scores for
the distributed case are averaged over 26 trials. Intuitively, inter-category (A and B) similarities
tend to _e evidence across lateral subtrees. In cases such as ':J', the feature is actually more
predictive of category B than A, thus adding nothing to the category match score of the atypical
observations to which these features belong, or actually detracting from it.
5.3.3 DISCUSSION OF' TYPICALITY RESULTS
Taken alone and collectively the data from our intra-category and inter-category studies demon-
strate that category match accurately ranks test item response time. To better illustrate this,
Table 8 shows the predicted response times from the local and distributed category match scores
of Table 7 that were obtained from a Linear regression. Category match accounts for 95.7% of the
variance in response time in the local case (F(1,4) = 88.7, p < 0.001) and 96.6% in the distributed
case (F(1,4) - 114.1, p < 0.001). x3 While both strategies account for most of the variance,
the distributed representation compresses the category match scores across the typicality range,
13. We considered the intra.c_tegory ud inter-category dat_ as one sample, given that our calculation of category
match scores in each case wM identical Considering the dAt8 u two'separate samples yields similar accounts of
variance and predicted response times.
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Table8.Human and predictedresponsetimesforRosch and Mervis(1975)data.
RESPONSE
TIME
PREDICTED
TIME
(LOCAL)
PREDICTED
TIME
(Coswzs)
INTRA- HIGH 560MS 526 535
CATEGORY MEDIUM 617MS 606 615
OVERLAP (A) Low 692MS 753 713
INTER- Low 909MS 938 968
CATEGORY MEDIUM 986MS 1008 995
OVERLAP (B) HIGH 1125MS 1057 1062
possibly because it bettertailorsrecognitionto an observation. More specifically,distribution
indicatesthat typicalityrankings emerge from variationalong two dimensions of categorization
(Rosch, 1978). Relativelyunique featuresto a category willtend to diffuseactivationtowards
subordinate categories(i.e.,along a verticaldimension). Features that overlap with contrasting
categoriesdiffuseactivationacrossnodes that classifyobservationsofmore than one contrastcat-
egory (i.e.,a horizontaldimension).Local accounts of typicalityonly considervariancealong this
latterdimension.
A distributedmodel makes the verticaldimension explicitin explanationsof typicality.This
suggestsinteractionswith basic-leveleffects,which alsoemerge from variationalong thisdimension.
For example, Rosch et al.(1976) predictedand Jolicoeur,Gluck, and Kosslyn (1984) verified
that the human preferencefor the basic levelis qualified.In particular,an observation (e.g.,
a specifichicken)may be sufficientlyatypicalof itsbasic-levelcategory (e.g.,bird)that itwill
be firstrecognized as an instanceof a subordinatecategory (e.g.,chicken). Low intra-category
overlapresultsin greateractivationof subordinatenodes, while thereisa simultaneous decrease
in activationof the basic-levelnode for atypicalobjectsdue to lessintra-categoryoverlap and
more inter-categoryoverlap.In casesofsuf[icientatypicality,thesetendenciesmay interactso that
classificationisinitiatedat a subordinatelevel.This isnicelyillustratedby the data ofTable 6 (a).
In thissimulationthe categorymatch scoresof atypicalobjects(nonsensestrings)were higher at
subordinatesthan at top levelnodes of a COBWEB-generated tree- presumably the basiclevel,
sincethislevelmaximizes categoryutility.
5.4 Fan Effects
To a largeextent,knowledge of basicleveland typicalityeffectsinfluencedour adoption of prob-
abilisticrepresentationsand the category match metric. However, the framework also accounts
forcertainfan effects(Anderson, 1976),which did not influenceour representationand processing
biases.Nonetheless,thesephenomena are accuratelypredictedby applicationof category match
to probabilisticrepresentations.
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Table 9. Human and predicted response times for Anderson's (1974) fan effect data.
(A) TRuEs (s) FALS_S
1 2 3
1111MS 1174MS 1222MS
(1120MS) (1157MS) (1184MS)
1167MS 1198MS 1222MS
(1157MS) (1195MS) (1259MS)
1153MS 1233MS 1357MS
(1184MS) (1259MS) (1321MS)
1 2 3
1197MS 1221MS 1264MS
(1168MS) (1240MS) (1306MS)
1250MS 1356MS 1291MS
(1240MS) (1312MS) (1379MS)
1262MS 1471MS 1465MS
(1306MS) (1379MS) (1444MS)
Fan efl'ects indicate that observations with frequently encountered features may be more dh_cult
to recognize than observations with relatively unique features, given that exposure across observa-
tions is relatively constant. Anderson (1974) demonstrated this principle in sentence recognition
tasks, which typically used simple sentences that consisted of a person and a location:
(I-I) The doctor is in the bank. (1-2) The fireman is in the park.
(2-I) The teacher is in the church. (2-2) The teacher is in the park.
Sentences vary in the number of features (persons, locations) that they share with other sentences.
The numbers preceding each sentence indicate the number of sentences that contain the respective
persons and locations. For example, sentence (2-1) indicates that 'teacher' appears twice and
'church' appears once in the set of four sentences.
After subjects were trained on selected sentences, they were presented with probes and asked
whether they had previously observed a sentence (true) or not (false). Anderson found that recog-
nition time increased in the true and false case with the frequency that a person and location was
present in training sentences. Table 9 shows matrices of nine ceils each, which show the averaged
human response data (Anderson, 1974) in the upper portion of each cell. Each cell corresponds to
items with the number of persons and locations denoted on the horizontal and vertical dimensions,
respectively. In general, response time for both true and false huraan data increases as one moves
to the right and/or down.
Elsewhere (Silber & Fisher, 1989), we explained these effects as a special case of typicality phe-
nomena, in which a subject was to classify test observations with respect to the singleton categories
formed from the training observations. In this account, the intra-category overlap between single-
ton categories is identical, since each observation contains exactly two features. Response time
diiTerences are thus explained entirely in terms of inter-category overlap. The more features that
an observation shares with other observations, the greater the overlap between its corresponding
singleton category and contrasting singleton categories. Observations with greater overlap should
require greater response time, which is consistent with typicality findings.
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In accounting forthesedata we willprimarilybe concerned with localrepresentations,particu-
larlyin the caseoftruetestitems.The reasonforthisisthat COBWEB may impose an organization
above the singletonlevel,but both featuresof a sentencecan only be predictedwith certaintyat
the leaves.In the case of'true'testitems we thusreportcategorymatch scoresfor the testitem's
correspondingsingleton,sincethisisthe strongestmatch. The falsecaseismore complicated.In
contrastto the Murphy and Smith experiments,subjectsare not given a verbally-cuedtargetcat-
egory on which to focus.Rather,we assume that allcategoriesmust be investigatedand rejected.
There are a number of ways thatwe might simulatethisprocess,but forsimplicitywe reportthe
average categorymatch scoreof an observationacrossallcategoriesin memory: thisisthe set of
singletonsin the localcase and singletonsplus internalnodes in the distributedcase. Averaging
captures the intuitionthatlargerscoresindicatethat more of memory must be investigated,but
itmakes minimal assumptions about how thismight be accomplished.
In additionto the human data at the top of each cell,Table 9 shows predictedresponse times
in parenthesesthat were generatedfrom a linearregression.Once again,falseresponse times are
proportionalto categorymatch, and thereisan inverserelationbetween the two in the truecase.
Category match scoresaccount for 83.8% of the variancein true response time (F(1,7) = 36.3,
p < 0.001) and 70.9% of the variance in false response time iF(l, 7) = 17.1, p < 0.004). 14
In contrast to our account of fan effects, Anderson's (1976) initial explanation suggested that
items were stored in a semantic network and activation spread from the features of a test sentence
until the original instance was found in memory (trues) or all links.from the features had been
exhausted (falses). A mathematical abstraction of Anderson's ACT processing model accounted
for 83% of the variance in the true and false response times. It appears that Anderson considered
the true and false cases as one sample, whereas we have modeled them separately. Overall the
AcT-based model yields better predictions than our model, but it also assumes more parameters
that are linked to the processing assumptions of ACT.
Recently, Anderson (in press) has provided an explanation of fan effect based on a rational model
of information retrieval systems. A key ingredient in his explanation is the cue validity of features
towards a sentence. Similarly, we can see the role of cue validity in category match by reexpressing
itas _j P(l,_)P(C]l,_)P(1,_[C)-P(Vj)P(C)P(Vj). SinceP(P_]C)'sand P(C)'s are constantacross
allsingletoncategories,a dominant factorin categorymatch are the cue validities,P(C[_). More
generally,low cue validityreflectsgreateroverlapwith contrast(singleton)categories.In fact,as
firstobserved by Jane Silber(personalcommunication), itisthe relianceon cue validitythatunifies
fan with typicalityphenomena, notablythe aspectthat emerges from inter-categoryoverlap.
6. General Discussion
In thispaper we presentedspeculativeand rationalanalysesofbasiclevel,typicality,and fan effects.
Our primary goalwas to verifythe abilityof Gluck and Corter;scategoryutilityand our category
match varianttopredicthuman responsetime;our preciseapplicationofcategorymatch necessarily
.#.#
14. We considered the true and false data as separate samples, given differences in the calculation of category match
scores between the two cases.
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varied with differences across the experimental studies, but collectively our various assumptions are
consistent. In the case of all 'true' stimuli, response time is predicted by the score of the node that
maximizes category match and that satisfies the conditions of the stimnlus (e.g., membership in
a target category; possession of both person and location features of the stimulus). In the 'false'
cases, response time is predicted by a function of the match scores of nodes that must be examined
in order to issue a false response with certainty (e.g., a target category if one is supplied or all
categories in memory otherwise).
A benefit of exploiting Gluck and Corter's rational analysis is that it provides a specification of
concept quality that has both computational and psychological merit. In particular, we coupled
category utility and methods from machine learning (Kolodner, 1983; Lebowitz, 1982) in the proba-
bilistic representations and classification strategies of COBWEB. Our ongoing research is advancing
in two directions: to improve the system so that it is more fully consistent with the psychological
phenomena, and to expand the scope of the model to other areas of cognition, notably problem
solving.
6.1 The Role of Indexing
Despite the descriptive merits of our specification, we have noted that it leaves certain 'imple-
mentation' issues unexplained. For example, our analysis of the Murphy and Smith data required
that false response times rise with category match scores. However, taken alone, the assumption -
thatincreasedmatch impliesfasteraccess- suggeststhatfalsecategorieswith highermatch scores
would be more quicklyaccessed,thus allowingforfasterrejection.To resolvethisproblem, we
appealed to assumptionsabout processingand representationwhich requiredthatpoorlymatching
categorieswould be more quicklyrejected.We can now fleshout some generalmechanisms that
willrealizethesebehavioralconstraints.
Many theoriesoflearningand memory have addressedthe problem ofidentifyingand exploiting
informativefeaturesforclassification.Category utilityand categorymatch suggestthat a feature
positivelyinforms the categorizationprocess ifand only ifP(IIC) > P(f). This criterionof
featureinformativenesshas been suggested by data in such diverseareas as stereotypetheory
(McCauley, Stitt,& Segal,1980) and animal learning(Rescorla,1968),as wellas otherareasofAI
and psychology (Schlimmer, 1986).
However, strictadherence to thiscriterionmay stillallow featuresoflittlebenefitto be evalu-
ated.For example, P(flC) - 1.0 forallsingletoncategories,thus satisfyingthe criterionformost
leaves.In response,Fisher (1988,1989) and Quinlan (1986)have employed a varietyof methods
fordeterminingwhen the P(IIC) > P(f) relationissignificant.Given categoryutility'srelationto
Jones'(1983)collocationmeasure - P(C[V)P(V]C) - an attractivemethod would be to findnodes
thatmaximize thisproduct foreach feature.Intuitively,these willbe the most specificategories
(i.e.,yieldinghigh P(VIC)) forwhich the featureisstilldiscriminating(i.e.,yieldinghigh P(CIV)).
For example, the feature'fly'may be maximized at 'birds',but below thisitdoes not discriminate
among birds.Our heuristicassumption isthatatcollocation-maximizingnodes a feature'spresence
becomes approximately independent ofmembership inlower-levelcategories.
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This heuristiccreatesa 'horizon'beyond which a featuredoes not discriminate.We may impose
thishorizon through indezing (Feigenbaum & Simon, 1984; Kolodner, 1983; Lebowitz, 1982): a
featurelabelsa linkfrom a node to one or more ofitsdescendents;the linkistraversedonly when
an observationwith that featureisobserved.For example, in the zoologicaltaxonomy, 'fly'would
index the categories'vertebrate'and 'bird'from the taxonomy's root,sincethesenodes are within
the horizon determined by collocation.15 In many cases,a feature'scollocationismaximized at
the root and thus does not index any node. This indexing strategymay alsobe recursivelyapplied
so that descendentsof 'bird'are indexed by featuresthat discriminatethem from the 'bird'node.
Notice that 'fly'would not index any descendant in thiscontext,whereas 'not-fly'presumably
would. Conversely,'fly'would not index 'mammal' from the root,but withinthe 'mammal' context
itwould discriminate'bats'.
In the revisedmodel, classificationwould be based on a categorymatch scorethat iscomputed
onlyover the featuresofan observationthatare used forindexing.All such scoreswillbe positive,
with the maximum score dictatingcategorymembership. This procedure would recursefrom the
maximum node untilitreached a 'dead end', at which no indicesfor the observationremain.
Computationally,thisindexingscheme radicallydelimitsthe portionsof memory that are accessed
foreach observation,without appealingto ad hoe thresholds.
This strategyalsoappears to have desirablepsychologicalproperties,but at thispoint we can
only speculatewith respectto some ofthe data. First,the approach breaksthe basic-leveltiethat
we reportedinrelationto the Hoffman and Ziesslerstudies;in the caseofone tree,subjectstreated
the top-most nodes as basic,but categorymatch predicteda tiebetween these nodes and their
children.In thiscase,indexingbringsallfeaturesto bear on the top-levelnodes,but itremoves a
featurefrom the match computation forthe middle-levelnodes. Basic-levelidentificationsare also
accuratelypredictedin the other studies,as are typicalityrankings from the Rosch and Mervis
studies.
The revisedmodel alsopromises to explainresultswith falsetestitems. To review our earlier
account of Murphy and Smith's data, the 'false'targetis verballycued, which is the only cue
in the case of superordinate-onlyrelatednessand unrelatedness.Their matching score ismore
quicklyoverwhelmed by the match scoreof the correctcategory than is the falsetargetin the
basic-relatednesscase. There are no concept-specificthresholds,but one can view recognitionas
mediated by implicitand variablethresholdsthat emerge from the competition among contrast
categories.Membership in a categorycan be rejectedwhen a dead end isreached and a competing
category has a highermatching score.A similaraccount alsoappliesto Anderson's data. Thus,
our account of the falsedata suggeststhatlow match scoresin our specificationtranslateto more
dead ends in categorization.
15. This differs from our earlier systems (Fisher, 1988; Silber & Fisher, 1989), which directed indices on/_/ at
collocation-maximizing nodes (e.g., bird, but not vertebrate). This strategy proved too fragile, paxticularly
during the early stages of le._-ming.
32 D. FISHP.a AND P. L,tNOLBY
6.2 Models of the Planning Process
In addition to improving our account of categorization phenomena, we are extending the model of
recognition and learning to domains such as planning. This work is closely related to a growing
body of research in machine learning that is focused on problem solving (e.g., Minton, 1988; Shavlik,
1989). Much of this work has focused on analytic learning methods (Mitchell, Keller, & Kedsr-
Cabelli, 1986) that transform knowledge from one form into another.
In contrast, we propose that learning in problem-solving domains is best modeled as concept
formation, in which memory organizes problem-solving experience in a manner that facilitates
efficient reuse and that incrementally transforms a novice into an expert. Our approach augments
a problem solver with a concept formation component that organizes problem descriptions and
solution traces (Allen & Langley, 1989; Yang & Fisher, 1989). A new problem is classified via the
concept hierarchy in hopes of finding a reusable solution trace. In cases where a complete solution
cannot be recovered, one may still obtain a partial solution by recovering predictable subtraces
at nodes encountered during classification. Our framework is consistent with psychological (Chi,
Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981) and computational (Bareiss, 1989) views that expertise involves an
ability to solve problems via classification versus search.
We expect that many of the behaviors that occur in conceptual memory - such as typicality and
basic-level effects - will also occur with problem-solving memory. Thus, we hope to account for
many of the same types of phenomena in episodic memory that we explained for object memory.
This work is also addressing some limitations of featural and probabilistic models generally and
COBWEB specifically. In particular, we are extending our strategies to structured representations
(Smith & Merlin, 1981; Dietterich & Michalski, 1983), which allow relationships between object
features or components (e.g., nexl:-to(x, y)). In addition, we are using an object's function in
problem solving as a guide for concept learning (Wisniewski, 1989; Nelson, 1973). More generally,
we hope to develop a general-purpose cognitive architecture that is founded on the principles of
human memory that we have described here (Langley, Thompson, Iba, Gennari, & Allen, 1989).
Finally, we hope to illustrate that our analysis in particular, and rational/speculative analyses in
general, provide generic models of intelligent behavior that cognitive scientists can exploit, regard-
less of the side of the psychological/computational fence on which they typically reside.
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